programme. The outcome was an estimate of M$542 m. for capital expenditure and $98 m. for recurrent expenditure. Over the next two years, two committees were set up: first, to select so-called "priority schemes" for immediate submission to the Colonial Office for grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare funds; and second, to allocate these funds between Singapore and West Malaysia. The guiding principle in the first task was to finance revenue-producing schemes out of loans, annually recurrent expenditure out of revenue and nonrevenue-producing schemes out of grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare funds. About $43 m. was made available from the Colonial Development and Welfare funds to the two territories: West Malaysia was allocated $24 m., Singpore $7 m., while the balance of $12 m. was to be spent on joint projects.
The above exercise formed the basis of the Draft Development Plan, 1950-55, which was described as "an attempt to define the objectives of social and economic policy for the period 1950-5, to balance them in relation to each other and to plan them within range of the resources available to finance them." The plan itself was divided into four parts:
(1) the development of social services, (2) the development of national resources and utilities, (3) the development of trade and industry, and (4) a description of the sources of finance. The total capital expenditure 2 The various plans and reviews of the plans, published by the Malaysian Governm and printed by the Government Printer in Kuala Lumpur, are: (1) The Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya, 1950 Malaya, -5 (1950 ; (2) Progress Report on the Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya, 1950 Malaya, -5 (1953 ; (3) A Plan of Development for Malaya, 1956 -60, or The First Malaya Plan, 1956 -60 (1956 ; (4) The Second Malaya Plan, 1961 Plan, -5 (1961 ; (5) Interim Review of Development in Malaya under the Second Malaya Plan (1963); (6) The First Malaysia Plan, 1966 Plan, -70 (1965 ; (7) Mid-term Review of the First Malaysia Plan, 1966 Plan, -70 (1969 ; (8) The Second Malaysia Plan, 1971 Plan, -75 (1971 ; (9) Mid-term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971 Plan, -75 (1973 ; (10) The Third Malaysia Plan, 1976 Plan, -80 (1976 ; (11) Mid-term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976 Plan, -80 (1979 ; (12) The Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981 Plan, -85 (1981 .
Pacific Affairs by the government was set at $214.6 m., of which $55.2 m. was for the development of social services and $159.4 m. for the development of resources and utilities. Recurrent expenditure was estimated to be between $22.5 m. and $28.5 m. The projected amount for the development of social services varied from $13.2 m. to $17.7 m., while that for the development of resources and utilities was from $9.3 m. to $10.8 m.
While the Draft Development Plan was being written, the Consulta- The basis of this plan was the report of the IBRD mission which came to West Malaysia in 1954, at the height of the Emergency and the decline in the boom generated by the Korean War, to guage the economic potential of the country. The mission noted that the infrastructure for the main export industries, particularly the European-dominated sections, was well-developed. It recommended, therefore, that social overhead development should be concentrated on the non-export, predominantly Malay, rural sector of the economy. It also emphasized the need for a massive rehabilitation programme for the rubber industry to enable it to compete successfully with the synthetic rubbers industry.
The mission recommended a public-development expenditure of $778 m. over the period 1955-59. The biggest single item of expenditure was for rubber replanting ($125 m. or 16.6 per cent), followed by $94 m. (or 12.1 per cent) for the construction of roads and bridges in basically the non-export sector. The emphasis given to rural development can also be seen in the allocation for other development items.
The IBRD Report was a great help in the formulation of the First Malaya Plan, as it was the first detailed and comprehensive study of the problems and the needs of West Malaysia. The plan went along with the IBRD mission's emphasis on the need to rehabilitate the rubber industry and to develop the rural subsistence sector. It differed from the IBRD mission in that it also saw improvements to the tin industry and industrial development as being of the "highest priority." Significant differences can be seen in the allocation of public-development expenditure. In terms of the allocation between three broad categorieseconomic, social, and government miscellaneous and unallocated-the IBRD mission recommended 62:25:13, while the plan's suggested ratio was 60:30:10. In terms of the overall level of expenditure, the plan increased the IBRD Report recommended figure of $778 m. by nearly 48 per cent, to $1,149 m. This was to take care of the expected increase in the cost of construction and in the expenditure for certain "priority" items. The plan was dominated by the defence and security sector and the need of finding the revenue to finance the Emergency expenditure-problems aggravated by the decline in the prices of rubber and tin in the aftermath of the Korean War boom.
Second Malaya Plan, 1961-65 This was formulated with technical assistance from the IBRD and was conceptually more satisfactory than the previous plans in being more than an aggregation of separate departmental expansion programmes. The objectives, in the order in which they were given, were an improvement in the rural standard of living, the provision of greater employment opportunities and a faster rate of economic growth, the diversification of agricultural and industrial activities, and an expansion of social overhead facilities. The planning technique used was the incremental capital-output ratio one, where the investment requirement is calculated on the basis of the desired rate of growth of output and a given incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR). With a target rate-ofincrease of 22 per cent in the total output over the period 1961-65, and an ICOR of 4, the investment ratio was estimated at 18 per cent or invested over the preceding five years. In terms of the investment ratio, it involved an increase from 12 per cent to 18 per cent.
The public sector was expected to spend $2,150 m., or more than twice the amount of the actual public development expenditure of the previous five years. The private sector was expected to invest the other $2,900 m., which again represented a substantial increase (40 per cent) over the level achieved under the First Malaya Plan, 1956-60. The bulk of this increase was projected to take place in the manufacturing, road transport, construction, and commerce sectors. The highest rate of increase in output was expected to take place in the construction industry (79 per cent), and the lowest in the agricultural and other services sectors (15 per cent). The other sectors into which the economy had been divided-the mining and manufacturing sector, the transport and utilities sector, and the government services sector-were projected to grow at the rates of 36, 24, and 22 per cent, respectively. The level of employment was expected to go from 2,215,000 to 2,555,000 jobs, an increase of 15 per cent. The construction industry was projected to increase its intake of labour fastest (75 per cent), which was in line with the projected increase in output, though a slight employment lag was assumed. The overall employment lag was expected to be much higher, as the percentage increase in employment was assumed to be only 68 per cent of the percentage increase in output.
First Malaysia Plan, 1966-70 Before the formation of Malaysia in September 1963, each of the three component states-West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak-had its own development plan. The First Malaysia Plan was the first integrated plan for the three regions. It was also the first phase of a twenty-year Perspective Plan and presented the short-run measures of the government to solve the economic and social problems of the country within a broad and long-run strategy of economic development. The stated objectives and the planning technique adopted were basically the same as those in the previous plan. The fundamental aim was the creation of an environment in which all three ethnic groups could live in dignity and harmony. This was to be achieved through a faster rate of economic growth, the creation of greater employment opportunities, and a reduction in the relative economic imbalance in the distribution of income and wealth. Economic diversification, infrastructural development and family-planning programmes were simply operational devices to bring about the fundamental objective.
The technique used was primarily the ICOR approach. The real gross national output was projected to grow by 4.9 per cent per annum, or 24 per cent over the period 1966-70. With an assumed ICOR of 3.9, investment was set at $9,730 in., or 19 per cent of the gross national product. The private sector was expected to be the "engine of growth"; its share of the investment was $6,160 in., the bulk of which was to take place in the industrial sector and its related trades. The traditional areas of estate planting and replanting, dwellings and commercial buildings, and mining equipment were scheduled to play a smaller part. The aim was to create a level of investment which would increase from $1,010 m. Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75 The formulation of this plan was influenced very significantly by the civil disturbances of May 1969, which revealed that under the apparent calm and prosperity there was a strong undercurrent of discontent in West Malaysia. Consequently, the plan gave highest priority to achieving a more even distribution of income and wealth. Its New Economic Policy aims at the eradication of poverty by raising income-levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race.
The New Economic Policy also aims at accelerating the process of restructuring the Malaysian society to correct the economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function.
The New Economic Policy consists, therefore, of two prongs. The first-the poverty prong-aims at increasing the access of the poor to land, physical capital, training, and other public amenities. By increasing the quantity and the quality of the factors of production at the disposal of the poor, it is hoped that the incidence of absolute poverty will be reduced substantially. The second prong-that of restructuring-aims at reducing the dependence of the Malays and other indigenous people on subsistence agriculture and seeks to increase their role in the modern rural and urban sectors of the economy. These changes are projected to occur over a twenty-year Perspective Plan period, 1971-90, and the plan was the first in a series of development plans to be formulated and implemented over this period.
In operational terms, the restructuring prong has two explicit quotagoals. The first is that employment by sector should approximate more A growth rather than a redistributive strategy is to be adopted in eradicating poverty and in restructuring society. As far as the eradication objective is concerned, this means that policies will be pursued to ensure the compatibility of growth and equity objectives. As far as the restructuring objective is concerned, this means that the increase in the Employment was projected to increase by 596,000 jobs at an average annual growth-rate of 3.2 per cent. The labour force was expected to increase at the same rate to produce 645,000 additional workers. The number of people unemployed was therefore expected to increase by 49,000, and the rate of unemployment to be held at no more than its 1970 level of 7.3 per cent of the labour force.
In contrast to the First Malaysia Plan, the government was expected to take a more active and direct part in reducing the economic disparity between the Malays and the non-Malays. Land development would be stepped up with greater Malay participation in commerce and business actively encouraged, either through a more determined implementation of existing policies or through the establishment of enterprises for Malays by such statutory bodies as PERNAS (Perbadanan Nasional Berhad). In the past, the programme to encourage Malay participation in the modern urban sector concentrated on the provision of educational and credit facilities. Equipped with paper qualifications and some capital, the aspiring Malay "entrepreneurs" had been left to fend for themselves in a highly imperfect market system. This passive programme had failed, and the government had now decided to play a more direct and active part in its programme to place 30 per cent of the commercial and industrial activities under Malay management and ownership by 1990.
Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80 This is the second of four 5-year plans designed to implement the objectives of the New Economic Policy. The strategy adopted is the same as that of the Second Malaysia Plan, which is to reduce the incidence of poverty and to restructure society through a growth rather than a redistributive strategy.
The target set for the real GDP was 8.5 per cent per annum, and it was anticipated that growth would be concentrated in the first part of the plan period, as external demand would be weak from 1978 onward.
Pac/ifc Affairs
The main source of this growth was expected to come from the private sector, with exports and private investment playing the dominant role.
This was in contrast to the position in the Second Malaysia Plan, where public consumption and investment were the principal sources of growth in output.
Employment was planned to increase by 743,000 jobs, thereby reducing the unemployment rate from 7.0 per cent to 6.1 per cent. The bulk of this increase was scheduled to come from the manufacturing, public administration, wholesale and retail trade, and agricultural sectors, in descending order of importance. This increase in employment was expected to provide for 41 per cent of the increase in real GDP of 8.5 per cent per annum.
EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Draft Development Plan, 1950-55, and First Malaya Plan, 1956-60 The above plans were no more than aggregations of the expansion programmes of separate governmental departments. The planning procedure was simple. Each government department was requested to submit its own claim for recurrent and development expenditure. The total of these claims would normally exceed the funds available, and a committee, acting under certain unwritten rules and criteria, would reduce the sum total of the claims until it equalled that of the funds available. These were, therefore, partial plans which were formulated with no regard for internal consistency. Moreover, the method by which the respective claims of the government departments were reduced to achieve equivalence between funds demanded and funds available left much to be desired. Priorities were not stated, nor were ground rules laid. Under such conditions, the scope for haphazard decisions based on non-economic considerations was very wide.
At the same time, the implementation of these plans, which were meant to spearhead the economic development of the country, was often delayed and, in certain cases, even halted because of the needs of the Ordinance 1952) and other government assistance resulted in 308,000 acres being replanted and 86,000 acres being newly developed. The estates responded even faster, for they replanted 357,000 acres and developed 79,000 acres. As a result of all these activities, the acreage under high-yielding materials increased from 30 to 46 per cent of the total acreage over the plan period.
In its review of the First Malaya Plan, the Second Malaya Plan pointed out that rough estimates of the total output of goods and services over the period 1956-60 showed an average arithmetic growthrate of 4.0 per cent per annum. This was faster than the corresponding growth-rate of the population, so that the per capita income went up by an average of 0.7 per cent per annum. The respective average compound rates of growth were 3.7 per cent and 0.6 per cent. These rates of increase, while respectable in themselves and relatively high compared to those achieved in other less developed countries, probably underestimate the achievement of the First Malaya Plan. It should be remembered that the plan's two major aims were the rehabilitation of the rubber industry and the provision of more and better physical amenities to the rural sector. Both programmes were successfully implemented; but, as their gestation periods were much longer than five years, the benefits were not reflected in increases in the GDP over the period 1956-60. In any case, the First Malaya Plan did not contain any forecasts regarding income growth.
To sum up, the Draft Development plan and the First Malaya Plan were constructed without adequate knowledge of planning techniques.
They were basically development programmes for the public sector, formulated without any check for internal consistency. No attempt was made to relate capital requirements of both the private and the public sectors to target levels of such variables as income and employment.
However, if they are assessed within this narrow framework-that is, as public development programmes-then they were carried out quite satisfactorily, especially in view of the heavy demands of the Emergency.
Second Malaya Plan, 1961-65 This document was superior to its two predecessors both in presenta- The second area of criticism concerns the employment and the equity objectives. Though the plan succeeded in fulfilling its employment target, the rate of unemployment was still at a relatively high 6 per cent. In all probability, the actual rate of unemployment was higher than 6 per cent, because the use of Western-oriented concepts of employment, unemployment and underemployment in Malaysian conditions tended to underestimate the seriousness of the problem. To the extent that the provision of rural infrastructure had improved the health and living conditions of the rural population and had provided cheaper and easier access to the market, the government might have felt justified in claiming that it had increased the standard of living of the rural people.
However, it can easily be argued that many of the benefits of this indirect approach had accrued to the middlemen who controlled not only the sale of agricultural products, but also the goods purchased by the farmers.
First Malaysia Plan, 1966-70 This plan was also based on the aggregate Harrod-Domar model, so that the criticisms directed at this model of planning in connection with the previous plan are also applicable here. Our evaluation will therefore be concentrated on the fulfillment of planned development expenditure and achievement of overall objectives such as income and employment.
The total investment was $8,204 m., which was about 15.6 per cent short of the target of $9,730 m: private investment amounted to $5,050 m., about 18 per cent below the target of $6,160 m., while public investment was $3,153 m., some 12 per cent short of the target of $3,570 m. In terms of public development expenditure-which is public investment plus expenditure on defence, purchase of land, loans and grants to the private sector, and expenditure on the creation of physical assets owned by the private sector-there was only about a 7 per cent shortfall ($4,242 m. as against $4,551 m.) Although investment targets were not achieved, the rate of growth in output was greater than projected. Thus, while the plan envisaged that the GNP in constant prices would increase by 4.9 per cent per annum, the rate achieved was about 6.0 per cent per annum-from $8,637 m. in 1965 to $11,537 m. in 1970. At current market prices, the GNP rose at 6.5 per cent per annum as against the target of 4.8 per cent per annum, in spite of a fall in the prices of the country's major export-commodities.
The failure of the plan to predict the growth of output accurately was due to the insensitivity of the Harrod-Domar model to external factors.
The "engine of growth" over the period of the plan was expected to be the domestic sector. Against all expectations, however, it was the export sector which spearheaded the growth of the economy. On the whole, the prices of the country's major export-commodities did not decline as much as projected, and the output of practically all these commodities was higher than estimated. The result was that the value of merchandise exports increased at 6.3 per cent per annum as against the plan's forecast of 0.6 per cent per annum. The error in forecasting the growth of output was "painless," insofar as the planned target was smaller than that actually achieved. However, the same could not be said of the target for employment. The number of jobs created in West Malaysia was 350,000 as against the target of 377,000. At the same time, the labour force increased by 420,000 compared to the plan's estimate of 377,000. The programme to bring about a more equitable distribution of income and wealth was generally felt to have been largely ineffective.
There are no reliable statistical data to substantiate this claim, but the The actual policies adopted to eradicate poverty in the rural areas over the plan period, 1971-75, were basically the same as those of the earlier period. They emphasized land development, the provision of drainage and irrigation facilities to increase the planted padi acreage, the supply of electricity, and so on. In other words, the programmes sought to increase the quantity and the quality of the factors of production available to the rural population. The result was a decrease in the incidence of poverty in all but one of the agricultural sub-sectorsnamely, the estate workers, the majority of whom were rubber-tappers whose wages were tied to rubber prices. Over the period 1970-75, rubber prices rose more slowly than the consumer price index, causing a decline in these workers' real standard of living. For the agricultural sector as a whole, however, the incidence of poverty decreased from 68. The programme to eradicate urban poverty is highly dependent on the programme to erase rural poverty. Failure of the latter will further widen the gap between urban and rural incomes and increase the ruralurban flow. By itself, the expansion of urban employment cannot reduce the flow and so reduce the incidence of urban poverty; it may, in fact, paradoxically increase it. Specific measures to reduce poverty within the urban sector are, first, giving the poor greater access to such basic public services as housing, water supply and sewerage, and, second, providing greater urban employment opportunities. Of the first category, only the programme of building low-cost houses is directed specifically at the urban poor, and the number of such houses built over the period 1971-75 (13,244) was much too small to make a significant impact. The other programmes in the first category had a target population which extended beyond that of the poor, and the benefits accruing to the urban poor could not have been more than peripheral.
The provision of greater urban employment opportunities has always been an objective of planning. However, the actual industrial policies pursued have not always been compatible with such an objective.
Mention has often been made of the bias towards capital-intensive activities inherent in the 1958 Pioneer Industries Ordinance and the 1968 Investment Incentives Act. In 1971, amendments were made to the latter to provide special incentives for employing more labour. This provision is known as the Labour Utilization Relief, where the duration of the exemption from the corporate tax depends on the number of workers employed. Thus, a company that can provide employment for 51 to 100 employees on its production day can enjoy tax relief for two years, and the exemption can be extended to a third, fourth and fifth year if the labour force is expanded to more than 100, 200 and 350 employees, respectively. Prima facie evidence suggests, however, that the effect of the Labour Utilization Relief may not be significant.
The provision that the duration of the tax holiday varies directly with the employment level, subject to a qualifying level of 51 employees, means that the scheme is biased, a priori, towards the bigger enterprises.
In 1972, the year of the most recent industrial census, the number of establishments that employed more than 50 workers each was only 700, or just 6 per cent of the total number of manufacturing establishments in Peninsular Malaysia. The imposition of a qualifying employment level of 50 workers before any subsidy is granted effectively excludes numerous small-scale family concerns from the scheme. Also, given that larger firms tend also to be the more capital-intensive ones, the result of introducing the Labour Utilization Relief may well have been the establishment of large and capital-intensive firms.
These criticisms of the programme to eradicate urban poverty are given weight by the fact that the incidence of poverty only decreased from 21.3 to 19.0 per cent. The programme differed only in degree, and not in kind, with policies implemented before 1970. Had the programme been directed more at the poverty groups themselves, or had the same policies simply been implemented on a wider scale, the government would have enjoyed greater success in this area.
A general criticism of the programme to eradicate rural and urban poverty is that they have increased the inequality in income distribution. Table 1 shows the ratio of the mean to the median monthly household incomes by race and geographical location in Peninsular Malaysia over the period 1970-79. An increase in the ratio signifies a worsening in the inequality in income distribution. It can be seen that, while the average real monthly household income of the urban, rural, Malay, Chinese, and total populations had increased over the period, this was accompanied by a worsening in the inequality in income distribution. The incidence of poverty has been reduced, but this has been achieved at the cost of an increase in income inequality in most sections of the population. It is not a case of the "rich getting richer and the poor poorer," but rather one of the "poor getting less poor, and the rich much richer." by 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990, respectively. From the data available in the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80, it would appear that the wealth-target for 1975 for Peninsular Malaysia agencies" rather than "bumiputera individuals" that would spearhead the wealth restructuring prong of the NEP is borne out by Table 2 guarantee that state enterprises will be run with economic efficiency. In fact, the economic losses suffered by some of them (e.g., UDA) suggest that the exact opposite may be true. Senior managers are usually politicians or civil servants on secondment and may not necessarily owe allegiance to the statutory bodies they head. Their tasks may be made more difficult and sometimes impossible by the lack of specified goals and by the presence of powerful ex-officio members of the board which may hamper critical analysis and rational decision-making. In any case, politicians and civil servants do not necessarily make good businessmen, nor are they immune to the temptations that inevitably arise from the rapid concentration of economic power in the hands of a small group of people. All these problems will be compounded if the process of concentration is accelerated.
If private investment slows down and there is gross economic inefficiency in the operation of the state enterprises, their economic growth and the growth of the corporate sector will be adversely affected.
The slowing down of g will require a higher Malay share of the increase in the stock of wealth (p), which then requires an increase in the activities of the statutory bodies-which may further slow down the rate of growth of the corporate stock. Eventually, we may reach a stage where the growth strategy is abandoned in favour of a redistributive strategy.
Another important consequence of an increasing concentration of economic power under bureaucratic control, and of the restructuring strategy of the NEP in general, is the growing inequality in the distribution of income and wealth within the bumiputera community.
The majority of the shares reserved for the bumiputera community that are bought are in fact purchased by the richer members of the community. The purchase of shares to be held in trust for the poor bumiputera individuals not only increases the power of the relatively small number of bumiputera politicians and civil servants in charge of statutory bodies, but also boosts their income very considerably. That there was such an increase in income inequality within the Malay community over the period 1970-79 is revealed in Table 1 . This growing inequality is inevitable in the short run under the restructuring strategy of the NEP. The fear is that it will persist or even worsen in the long run. Without tight supervision, the trustees of the assets may come to administer them on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends and relatives-rather than on behalf of the alleged beneficiaries, the Malay poor. It may be a case of "so near, and yet so far" for the Malay poor, and this may well lead to an erosion of their political support which the NEP was intended to increase in the first place.
The employment-composition target of the New Economic Policy requires that the employment pattern by sector and occupation be more reflective of the racial composition of the population by the year 1990.
By using the estimated employment growth-rates for 1970-90 from the Third Malaysia Plan, we can calculate, through formula (1), the percentage of the new jobs created that must be taken up by the various racial groups in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In Table 3 , these are compared to the figures actually realized for the period, 1970-75.
It can be seen that significant divergences exist between the intended and the actual percentage shares in the three sectors. In the case of the agricultural sector, the actual shares of the Malays and the Indians were much higher than the required shares, while those of the Chinese were well below. In the secondary sector, the actual shares of the Malays in the new jobs created were below those required, while in the tertiary sector they were slightly below. As a result of these divergences, the fulfillment of the employment restructuring target by sector by 1990 must require, for the remainder of the period, a much faster rate of movement of per cent over the whole of the plan period-much higher than the 9.3
per cent recorded in public investment. were basically the same as those used in the period of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75. As such, they are subject to the same type of criticism. In the rural areas they did not deal significantly with the fundamental problem of landlessness: there was no attempt to reform the land-tenure system in non-FELDA acreage, and the comprehensive and expensive "captive" FELDA approach did not permit a faster rate of land development. In the urban areas, specific programmes aimed at the urban poor were few, and tax incentives continued to favour large-scale and capital-intensive enterprises. Income distribution continued to become more unevenly distributed (Table 1) . that the target date must be moved back. The employment composition target is in fact much more difficult to achieve than the wealth target.
While more and more shares can be held in trust for the Malay poor by a few unit trusts for a manageable outlay, the same cannot be said of expanding the employment function of the government.
CONCLUSIONS
Our assessment of development planning in Malaysia over the period 1950-80 shows that it achieved the target rates of economic growth and reduced the incidence of poverty. However, the record also shows that the restructuring programme fell behind schedule significantly and that income distribution had worsened.
The Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981-85, claims that it will continue the strategy adopted in the previous two plans in implementing the New Economic Policy. However, it is highly unlikely that such an approach can fulfill the restructuring objective of the programme. The second decade of the New Economic Policy must see a marked increase in the role of the public sector in the restructuring programme if the operational targets are to be achieved.
This will further increase the bureaucratic control of the economy.
Until now, this process has had no marked adverse effect on economic growth. However, the situation may change as the easy phase of "government substitution" comes to an end. There is also the possibility of a precautionary discounting of potential investment returns on the part of the private sector. This will then necessitate further government intervention, producing further shortfalls in private investment-and so on, in a vicious circle.
It is also highly unlikely that the trend towards increasing unevenness in income distribution will be arrested. In the past, this was perhaps not as politically important an issue as it was made out to be. In the beginning, so long as the poorest of the poor were provided their basic needs, as was done in programmes to reduce the incidence of poverty, the rural electorate remained content. Once these basic needs were provided, however, the recipients became more concerned about relative poverty or affluence, and the issue of increasing income inequality became more pressing. The Fourth Malaysia Plan obviously does not see the mid-way stage of the New Economic Policy period as a watershed in this respect, as its prescription is to have more of the same medicine.
This suggests either political fine-tuning or political brinksmanship of the highest order.
Griffith University, Australia, June 1982
